How Long is a Piece of Cable? Equilibrium Determination of Local Telephone Areas

This paper studies the endogenous determination of telephone local calling areas. In many telephone systems, calls between users in the same calling area are local; calls to outside the calling area are long distance and priced differently. We allow the extension of this area to be treated as a strategic variable. We show the extension of the calling areas which maximizes the carrier's profit to be the same which a welfare maximizing regulator would choose. Under a price cap regime in which prices are required to meet an average price constraint, the firm manipulates strategically the extension of the local calling areas. We end the paper by considering the case of a competitive market. In this case, again, the owner of the local loop extends the local calling areas in response to decreased efficiency or increased competition of its competitors. Received April 25, 2002; revised version received September 9, 2002 Published online: April 30, 2003