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Selection institutions and war aims |
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| Authors: | James D. Morrow Bruce Bueno de Mesquita Randolph M. Siverson Alastair Smith |
| Affiliation: | (1) University of Michigan, 426 Thompson St, 4203 ISR, MI 48106-1248 Ann Arbor, USA;(2) Hoover Institution, CA 94305-6010, Stanford, USA;(3) Department of Political Science, University of California, Davis, One Shields Ave, CA 95616, Davis, USA;(4) Department of Politics, New York University, 715 Broadway, 4th floor, NY 10003, USA |
| Abstract: | We explore how the sizes of the winning coalition and selectorate influence the war aims of states. Leaders who answer to a small winning coalition are more likely to seek territorial gain as a way to increase state resources. Nonterritorial war aims produce a commitment problem in that after the war the defeated state may not comply with the victor's demands. States with large winning coalitions are more willing to continue the war to remove the enemy leader as a solution to this commitment problem. We test our hypotheses against the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set, and we find some support for our argument. Received: June 2004, Accepted: April 2005, Correspondence to: James D. Morrow |
| Keywords: | Winning coalition war aims postwar commitment problem interstate conflict |
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