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Equilibrium price formation in markets with differentially informed agents
Authors:Marta Faias  Carlos Hervés-Beloso  Emma Moreno-García
Institution:1.Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia,Universidade Nova de Lisboa,Caparica,Portugal;2.RGEA,Universidad de Vigo,Vigo,Spain;3.Facultad de Economía y Empresa,Universidad de Salamanca,Salamanca,Spain
Abstract:We consider a pure exchange economy with a finite set of types of agents which have incomplete and asymmetric information on the states of nature. Our aim was to describe the equilibrium price formation and analyze how the lack of information may affect the allocation of resources. To do so, we adapt to an asymmetric information scenario a variant of the Shapley–Shubik game introduced by Dubey and Geanakoplos (J Math Econ 39:391–400, 2003 ).
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