改制模式影响董事会特征吗?

本文考察了不同改制模式对于董事会特征的影响。通过分析1997—2000年我国285个国有企业首次公开发行后三年的数据,我们发现控股股东控制上市公司和董事会的动机及监管层政策规定是影响董事会领导层两职状态的重要原因。非完整改造公司中,控股股东更容易违反监管层的有关规定,委派本公司人员在上市公司同时兼任董事长和总经理职位。同时,非完整改造公司董事会的规模较大,董事会的活动强度较低,其激励程度也较低。

Do Restructuring Models Affect the Characteristics of Board of Directors?

This paper tests how different restructuring modes affect the characteristics of board of directors.Using a sample of 285 Chinese State-owned Enterprises(SOEs)that go public between 1997 and 2000,we find that the incentive of controlling shareholders to control the listed company and board and the policy of the supervisor are two important factors that lead to CEO Duality.The controlling shareholders of SOEs that go through incomplete reorganization are more likely to break the rules set by the supervisors and to assign their employees to certain posts like chairman and CEO of the listed company.Moreover,SOEs that go through incomplete reorganization tend to have larger board size,lower frequency of board activity and incentive degree.