Hedging derivatives in the banking industry: Evidence of investor confusion

Hedging derivatives are complex instruments that require particular scrutiny by bank regulators to ensure that a bank’s risk profile is consistent with sound banking practices. The Basel II agreement envisions a system of banking oversight that includes market discipline as a key element of the regulatory framework. A necessary condition in achieving market discipline is that market participants must be able to decipher the underlying conditions from reported results. We examine the relationship between investor confusion and the income effects arising from fair value recognition of hedging derivatives in the banking industry. We use abnormal trading volume as a proxy for investor confusion, and we find a positive and significant relationship between fair value accounting incomes and two alternative measures of abnormal trading volume. The findings suggest that accounting requirements alone may be insufficient to communicate the complexities of hedging derivatives to investors in a way that achieves the market discipline prescribed by Basel II. Bank regulators may need to augment extant efforts for transparency to ensure that risks are adequately communicated to the market.