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Short-term leaders should make long-term appointments
Authors:Amihai Glazer  Vesa Kanniainen
Affiliation:(1) Department of Economics, University of California–Irvine, Irvine, CA, 92697;(2) Department of Economics, University of Helsinki, 0014 Helsinki, Finland;(3) CESifo, Munich
Abstract:Top decision-makers (such as the U.S. President) often serve short terms, but make decisions with consequences long after they are gone. (Appointments of judges or of Federal Reserve Board members are two examples.) When a leader can choose his effort on an appointment, the organization’s performance may increase when the minimum term for an appointment increases, and when decisions are irreversible. In addition, ideological preferences can lead to better appointments.
Keywords:Appointments  Tenure  Effort  Ideology
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