Share pledging,payout policy,and the value of cash holdings |
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| Institution: | 1. King''s University College at Western University, London, ON N6A2M3, Canada;2. Deakin Business School, Deakin University, Melbourne, Burwood, VC 3125, Australia;1. Department of Finance, National Chengchi University, Taiwan;2. Department of Banking and Finance, Tamkang University, Taiwan;3. Department of Finance, National Taiwan University, Taiwan;4. Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, China |
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| Abstract: | Share pledging for insiders’ personal bank loans is associated with the agency problems of insider risk aversion and stock price crash risk. We examine the relation between insider share pledging and the value of cash holdings using the pledging data of listed firms in Taiwan. We find that the value of cash holdings is lower for pledging firms, especially for those that are relatively more risk averse. Pledging firms that repurchase shares have a higher marginal value of cash than those with other payout methods, likely due to the role of repurchases in reducing the stock price crash risk. Our results show how insiders’ personal financing incentives arising from share pledging would affect the value of cash holdings from the perspective of agency problems and payout policy. |
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| Keywords: | Payout policy Share pledging Value of cash holdings |
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