A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments |
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Authors: | John O Ledyard |
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Institution: | a Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Mail Code 228-77, Pasadena, California, USA 91125 b Departments of Politics and Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA 08544 |
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Abstract: | We consider the class of Bayesian environments with independent types, and utility functions which are both quasi-linear in a private good and linear in a one-dimensional private-value type parameter. We call these independent linear environments. For these environments, we fully characterize interim efficient allocation rules which satisfy interim incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality constraints. We also prove that they correspond to decision rules based on virtual surplus maximization, together with the appropriate incentive taxes. We illustrate these techniques with applications to auction design and public good provision. |
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Keywords: | 024 026 |
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