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Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations |
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| Authors: | Nolan H Miller John W Pratt Scott Johnson |
| Institution: | a Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 79JFK St, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA b Harvard Business School, Harvard University, Boston, MA 02163, USA c Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200, Australia |
| Abstract: | We consider the mechanism design problem when agents’ types are multidimensional and continuous, and their valuations are interdependent. If there are at least three agents whose types satisfy a weak correlation condition, then for any decision rule and any ?>0 there exist balanced transfers that render truthful revelation a Bayesian ?-equilibrium. A slightly stronger correlation condition ensures that there exist balanced transfers that induce a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which agents’ strategies are nearly truthful. |
| Keywords: | C70 D60 D70 D82 |
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