The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information |
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Authors: | Geoffroy de Clippel |
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Institution: | Department of Economics, Rice University, 6100 Main Street, Houston, TX 77005, USA |
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Abstract: | The type-agent core is a new solution concept for exchange economies with asymmetric information. It coincides with the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes of a simple competitive screening game. Uninformed intermediaries help the agents to cooperate in an attempt to make some profit. The paper extends the work of Perez-Castrillo Cooperative outcomes through non-cooperative games, Games Econ. Behav. 7 (1994) 428-440] to exchange economies with non-transferable utility and asymmetric information. The type-agent core is a subset of Wilson's coarse core Wilson, Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy, Econometrica 46 (1978) 807-816]. It is never empty, even though it may be a strict subset of Wilson's fine core. In addition, it converges towards the set of constrained market equilibria as the economy is replicated. |
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Keywords: | C71 C72 D51 D82 |
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