| 大、小股东和监管部门在上市公司治理中的动态博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 张秀武.大、小股东和监管部门在上市公司治理中的动态博弈分析[J].哈尔滨商业大学学报(社会科学版),2010(4):9-12. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张秀武 |
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| 作者单位： | 华侨大学数量经济研究院,福建,泉州,362021 |
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| 基金项目： | 福建省社会科学规划项目，福建省软科学重点项目，福建省教育厅社会科学研究项目，华侨大学科研基金资助项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 近年来，大股东侵权的事件屡见报端。为了维护证券市场的健康发展，保护中小投资者的利益，监管部门不断加强其监管力度，不少违规的大股东受到监管部门的查处。应用完全信息动态博弈模型对大股东、小股东和监管部门在上市公司治理中的行为进行分析，得出大股东侵占概率与处罚力度成反比、与监管成本成正比，监管部门查出的概率与处罚系数成反比，小股东上诉的概率与假定无关的结论。
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| 关 键 词： | 大股东 小股东 监管部门 动态博弈 |
Dynamic Game Analysis of Boss-stockholders,Minor-stockholders and Supervisor in Listed Corporate Governance |
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| ZHANG Xiu-wu.Dynamic Game Analysis of Boss-stockholders,Minor-stockholders and Supervisor in Listed Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Harbin University of Commerce:Social Science Edition,2010(4):9-12. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Xiu-wu |
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| Institution: | ZHANG Xiu-wu(Institute for Quantitative Economics of Huaqiao University,Quanzhou 362021,China) |
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| Abstract: | Recently,the infringement affairs of the boss-stockholders often appear in newspaper.For supporting the healthy development of the stock market and protecting the benefits of the small investors,the supervisor strengthened the power of supervision continuously.A good few boss-shareholders for violating the rules are checked by the supervisor.This paper applied complete information dynamic game model to analyze the behavior of boss-shareholders,minor-shareholders and supervisor in the listed company governan... |
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| Keywords: | boss-stockholder minor-stockholder supervisor dynamic game |
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