| 融资约束抑或代理冲突? 上市公司非效率投资动因研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 蔡吉甫.融资约束抑或代理冲突? 上市公司非效率投资动因研究[J].财经论丛,2012(3):86-91. |
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| 作者姓名： | 蔡吉甫 |
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| 作者单位： | 江西财经大学会计学院,江西南昌,330013 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部社科研究基金青年项目，江西省高校人文社会科学研究规划项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文利用投资价值效应的一般原理对我国上市公司的非效率投资产生的原因及其表现形式重新进行了审视和研究。研究发现,无论是国有控股公司还是非国有控股公司,公司经营业绩均与其投资支出呈现出倒U型的曲线关系,且投资支出比例分别在0.47727和0.36971时公司经营业绩达到最高。倒U型曲线关系表明我国上市公司的非效率投资既包含投资不足,又存在过度投资,因而是融资约束和代理问题共同作用的结果。
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| 关 键 词： | 融资约束 代理冲突 非效率投资 |
Financial Constraints or Agent Conflicts? A Study on the Motives of Inefficient Investment of Listed Companies |
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| CAI Ji-fu.Financial Constraints or Agent Conflicts? A Study on the Motives of Inefficient Investment of Listed Companies[J].Collected Essays On Finance and Economics,2012(3):86-91. |
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| Authors: | CAI Ji-fu |
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| Institution: | CAI Ji-fu(Accounting School,Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang 330013,China) |
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| Abstract: | Based on the theory of investment value effects,this paper studies the motives of inefficient investment of Chinese firms.Regression results show that the relationship between firm performance and its investment is significantly inverse U for both state-owned and non-state-owned listed firms,which indicates the reason why firms are engaged in inefficient investments lies in financial constraints as well as agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. |
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| Keywords: | financial constraints agent conflicts inefficient investment |
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