Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions |
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Authors: | Jinwoo Kim Yeon-Koo Che |
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Institution: | a Department of Economics, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90081, USA;b Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706, USA |
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Abstract: | We study auctions in which bidders may know the types of some rival bidders but not others. This asymmetry in bidders' knowledge about rivals' types has different effects on the two standard auction formats. In a second-price auction, it is weakly dominant to bid one's valuation, so the knowledge of rivals' types has no effect, and the good is allocated efficiently. In a first-price auction, bidders refine their bidding strategies based on their knowledge of rivals' types, which yields an inefficient allocation. We show that the inefficient allocation in the first-price auction translates into a poor revenue performance. Given a standard regularity condition, the seller earns higher expected revenue from the second-price auction than from the first-price auction, whereas the bidders are better off from the latter. |
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Keywords: | JEL classification codes: C70 D44 D82 |
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