| 基于委托代理博弈的水利工程PPP项目逆向选择与道德风险分析 |
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| 引用本文： | Thiravong Sisavath,吴海燕.基于委托代理博弈的水利工程PPP项目逆向选择与道德风险分析[J].水利经济,2016,34(4):9-12. |
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| 作者姓名： | Thiravong Sisavath 吴海燕 |
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| 作者单位： | 河海大学商学院;江苏省"世界水谷"与水生态文明协同创新中心;老挝国家电力公司 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金(71573072);国家社科基金重大项目(11ZD168);国家外国专家局高端外国专家项目(GDW20153200137);长江学者和创新团队发展计划(IRT13062) |
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| 摘 要： | 为保证水利工程PPP项目的顺利建设与运营,论文针对水利工程PPP项目的特点,在分析其逆向选择和道德风险产生原因和危害的基础上,构建了无不确定性的委托代理模型和有不确定性但可监督的委托代理模型,并对模型进行求解和分析,针对性地提出制定激励机制、提高政府监管效率和加大惩罚力度三个建议,以减少水利工程PPP项目中逆向选择和道德风险问题的发生。
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| 关 键 词： | 水利工程 PPP项目 逆向选择 道德风险 委托代理博弈 |
| 收稿时间： | 2016/3/16 0:00:00 |
Adverse selection and moral risk of water conservancy PPP projects based on principal-agent model |
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| Thiravong Sisavath,WU Haiyan.Adverse selection and moral risk of water conservancy PPP projects based on principal-agent model[J].Journal of Economics of Water Resources,2016,34(4):9-12. |
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| Authors: | Thiravong Sisavath WU Haiyan |
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| Institution: | Thiravong Sisavath;WU Haiyan;Business School, Hohai University;Jiangsu Provincial Collaborative Innovation Center of World Water Valley and Water Ecological Civilization;Laos State Power Company,Vientiane 999012,Laos; |
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| Abstract: | To ensure the smooth construction and operation of water conservancy PPP projects, the principal-agent model without uncertainties and the principal-agent model with supervisory uncertainties are established by analyzing the causes and hazards of adverse selection and moral risk with regard to the characteristics of water conservancy PPP projects. The above models are solved and analyzed. Finally, three suggestions are proposed to reduce the occurrence of adverse selection and moral risk, including formulation of excitation mechanism, improvement of government''s supervision efficiency and intensification of punishment. |
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| Keywords: | water conservancy project PPP project adverse selection moral risk principal-agent model |
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