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大股东侵害中小股东利益三方博弈分析
引用本文:杨国祥,胡一朗.大股东侵害中小股东利益三方博弈分析[J].重庆商学院学报,2006,16(5):72-74.
作者姓名:杨国祥  胡一朗
作者单位:莆田学院管理学院,福建莆田351100
摘    要:在理性经济人假设下,建立监管者、中小股东与大股东的三方博弈模型,通过求解纳什均衡,结合各参数变量的政策含义,在市场监管、公司治理等方面应做到:强化证券法及相关法律法规中有关民事赔偿责任的规定;监管者要严格依法办事,加大大股东侵害行为的成本,并采用先进的技术手段以降低监管成本;要提高中小股东的识别能力和维权意识;要减少大股东持股比例并增加公司财富.

关 键 词:大股东  中小股东  监管者  三方博弈
文章编号:1008-6439(2006)05-0072-03
收稿时间:05 11 2006 12:00AM
修稿时间:2006年5月11日

Trilateral game analysis of controlling shareholders' encroaching on small and medium-sized shareholders' benefit
YANG Guo-xiang,HU Yi-lang.Trilateral game analysis of controlling shareholders'' encroaching on small and medium-sized shareholders'' benefit[J].Journal of Chongqing Institute of Commerce,2006,16(5):72-74.
Authors:YANG Guo-xiang  HU Yi-lang
Institution:Department of Management, Putian University, Fulian Putian 351100,China
Abstract:Under the hypothesis of rational economic man,trilateral game model of supervisor,small and medium-sized shareholders and controlling shareholder to find out Nash equilibrium and to combine policy meanings of each parameter with variable is constructed.In the aspects of market supervision with company management,the regulations related to civil compensation responsibility in securities law and related laws should be reinforced,supervisors should strictly enforce the laws,increase cost of controlling shareholders' encroaching on benefit,use advanced method to decrease supervising cost and promote judging ability and right-protection consciousness of small and mediumsized shareholders,reduce share rate of controlling shareholder and increase benefit of the company.
Keywords:controlling shareholder  small and medium - sized shareholder  supervisor  trilateral game
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