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Public hedge funds
Authors:Lin Sun  Melvyn Teo
Affiliation:1. Fanhai International School of Finance and School of Economics, Fudan University, 220 Handan Road, Yangpu District, Shanghai 200433, the People’s Republic of China;2. Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University, 50 Stamford Road, Singapore 178899, Singapore
Abstract:Hedge funds managed by listed firms significantly under-perform funds managed by unlisted firms. The under-performance is more severe for funds with low manager deltas, poor governance, and no manager co-investment, or those managed by firms whose prices are sensitive to earnings news. Notwithstanding the under-performance, listed asset management firms raise more capital, by growing existing funds and launching new funds post listing, and harvest greater fee revenues than do comparable unlisted firms. The results are consistent with the view that, for asset management firms, going public weakens the alignment between ownership, control, and investment capital, thereby engendering conflicts of interest.
Keywords:Hedge funds  Asset management  Initial public offering  Agency  Conflicts of interest  G11  G12  G23
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