试论后危机时代保险公司治理的政府监管

2008年全球金融危机凸现出的金融保险机构治理失效问题,对重新审视和优化金融保险公司治理的政府监管提出了迫切要求。在后危机时代,只有基于保险公司治理的特征,在更加严格、高效的政府监管的指导下不断优化保险治理结构,增强其治理机制的有效性,才能从源头上防范其治理失效的风险,避免重蹈本次金融危机中大量金融保险机构破产倒闭的覆辙。本文基于利益相关者理论和委托代理理论,通过深入探讨后危机时代政府监管在引导保险公司治理取向、完善信息披露机制、优化治理各方的博弈,以及均衡内、外部治理等方面的职能作用,旨在为构建和优化我国保险公司治理的监管制度提供一定的理论依据。

On the Government Regulation for Insurance Company Governance in Times of Post Crisis

It is urgent to reexamine and optimize the supervision on insurers’ corporation governance,because of the failure corporate governance in 2008 Global Financial Crisis.To prevent the risk of ineffient corporate governance and avoid repeating bankruptcy in this financial crisis,it is essential to optimize insurers’ coporate governance structure and enhance the effectiveness of its governance mechanism in more strict and effient governance.Based on stakeholder theory and principal-agent theory,this paper aims at systematically researches into the functions of supervision to guide insurers’ corporate governance,perfect information disclosure mechanism,optimize the game of participants in insurers’ corporate governance,and balance internal governance and external governance.And this paper also provides some theoretical basis for constructing and optimizing supervision system of insurers’ corporation governance in the latter era of the international financial crisis in China.