Inferring ascending auction participation from observed bidders |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Arkansas, 1 University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR 72701, USA;2. Department of Economics, University of Alaska-Anchorage, USA;3. Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, USA;4. Department of Economics, Virginia Tech, 880 West Campus Drive, Blacksburg, VA 24061, USA;5. DIW Berlin, Germany;6. Department of Economics and Finance, University of South Alabama, 5811 University Drive N., Mobile, AL 36688, USA;1. Technische Universität München, Arcisstraße 21, D–80333 Munich, Germany.;2. University of Bamberg, Department of Economics, Feldkirchenstraße 21, D–96052 Bamberg, Germany;3. CESifo, Poschingerstraße 5, D–81679 Munich, Germany;1. Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, VA 22311, USA;2. Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, Orange, CA 92866, USA;1. Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC) and Barcelona GSE, Campus UAB, 08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain;2. ISEG, Universidade de Lisboa and UECE–Research Unit on Complexity and Economics, Rua Miguel Lupi, 20, 1249-078, Lisboa, Portugal;3. Departamento de Análisis Económico II, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED), Paseo Senda del Rey 11, 28040 Madrid, Spain;4. Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada (FEDEA), Calle Jorge Juan 46, 28001 Madrid, Spain;1. GREDEG (UMR 7321), University of Nice Sophia-Antipolis, 250 rue Albert Einstein, 06560 Valbonne, France;2. GREQAM (UMR 7316), Aix Marseille University, 2, rue de la vieille charité, 13236 Marseille Cedex 02, France;3. EHESS, France |
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| Abstract: | Participation in internet auctions goes well beyond those who place a bid. Participants arrive in random order, and if the auction’s standing price has already exceeded a participant’s valuation, she will not bid. Even so, her unreported valuation is a relevant part of demand for the item, and in an alternate random order, her bid would have been registered. I provide a method to estimate the average number of participants from the average number of bidders per auction. This enables estimation of the distribution of participant valuations from either the distribution of closing prices or the distribution of all observed bids. |
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