招商竞争下的地方政府与企业博弈行为

文章集中分析了在招商竞争中地方政府与企业之间、地方政府之间的动态博弈过程。通过建立一个三阶段的完美信息动态博弈模型,指出地方政府之间的招商竞争下,企业拥有了"退出"选择的可能。企业退出成本越低,"退出"选择的可置信威胁越大,其向政府"呼吁"产生的效果越好。对于地方政府来说,与其进行"让利竞争",不如完善地方公共设施与提高公共服务的质量,提供良好的制度与经济环境,锁定辖区内的企业,为地方经济的发展提供强劲的推动力。

Game behavior of government and enterprises in attraction investment competition

The paper focuses on discussing the dynamic game process between the local govern-ment and enterprises and among local governments in attraction investment competition.Through the establishment of a three stages of perfect information dynamic game model,we pointed out the profitscompetition between local governments giving enterprises chance toexitoption.the lower the cost of exit,the more effect of incredibly threatened to government,and the better effect caused by voice.For local government,it is better t...