Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments |
| |
Authors: | Hideki Mizukami Takuma Wakayama |
| |
Institution: | aFaculty of Economics, University of Toyama, 3190 Gofuku, Toyama 930-8555, Japan;bFaculty of Urban Liberal Arts, Tokyo Metropolitan University, 1-1 Minami-Osawa, Hachioji, Tokyo 192-0397, Japan |
| |
Abstract: | We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. We first show that in general environments, strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelation mechanism. We next prove that in weak separable environments, strategy-proofness is sufficient for dominant strategy implementation, by using an augmented revelation mechanism similar to the one devised by Jackson, Palfrey, and Srivastava Jackson, M.O., Palfrey, T.R., Srivastava, S., 1994. Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms. Games Econ. Behav. 6, 474–501]. Moreover, we focus on pure exchange economies without free disposal, and try to construct another augmented revelation mechanism that satisfies balancedness in and out of equilibrium, and which implements all strategy-proof social choice functions in dominant strategy equilibria. |
| |
Keywords: | Augmented revelation mechanism Strategy-proofness Balancedness Quasi-strong-non-bossiness The revelation principle |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|