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中国社会医疗保险中的道德风险及控制机制研究
引用本文:李冰水,李玉娇. 中国社会医疗保险中的道德风险及控制机制研究[J]. 广西经济管理干部学院学报, 2010, 22(4): 20-26
作者姓名:李冰水  李玉娇
作者单位:华北电力大学人文与社会科学学院,保定,071003;华北电力大学人文与社会科学学院,保定,071003
摘    要:
近几年来,医疗费用的迅速增长是世界各国普遍出现的现象,控制医疗费用、进行医疗保险改革成为一道世界性难题。而造成医疗费用激增的一个重要因素是医疗领域的道德风险问题。道德风险源于个人的机会主义倾向,是最大限度增进自身效用时做出不利于他人的行为所引起的风险。文章详细分析了中国社会医疗保险领域中道德风险存在的条件以及影响,并在分析结论的基础上提出了相应的的规避措施与建议。

关 键 词:社会医疗保险  道德风险  信息不对称  医疗服务供给方  医疗服务需求方

The Study on the Moral Hazard in the Social Medical Insurance System and Measures to Control it
LI Bing-shui,LI Yu-jiao. The Study on the Moral Hazard in the Social Medical Insurance System and Measures to Control it[J]. The Journal of Guangxi Economic Management Cadre College, 2010, 22(4): 20-26
Authors:LI Bing-shui  LI Yu-jiao
Affiliation:LI Bing-shui1 LI Yu-jiao1(1.Humanities and Social Sciences Department of North China Electric Power University,Baoding,071003 China)
Abstract:
In recent years,the problem that the medical expense rapid rise has become a kind of universal phenomenon in the world.So how to control the medical expense and conduct the reform of medical insurance system is a worldwide difficulty.Moral hazard is result from individual opportunism,and it is the action to promote one’s own utilities to the maximum at the cost of others’benefits.The article analyses the condition of moral hazard and its influences in detail.Moreover,the article based on conclusion explains relevant measures and comes up with a lot of suggestions.
Keywords:social medical insurance  moral hazard  asymmetric information  adverse selection  
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