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浅谈建设项目招投标无标底报价的投标机制选择
引用本文:高海燕,李爱春,郑建国.浅谈建设项目招投标无标底报价的投标机制选择[J].基建优化,2007,28(3):49-51.
作者姓名:高海燕  李爱春  郑建国
作者单位:兰州交通大学,交通运输学院,兰州,730070
摘    要:无标底的投标机制有利于形成有效的市场竞争环境,能鼓励各建筑承包企业提高管理水平、降低生产成本、提高生产水平.应用信息经济学中的信息不对称理论分析了建设项目招投标过程中的信息不对称,并在此基础上建立了基于委托代理关系的建设项目招投标模型,并探索较合理的投标机制.

关 键 词:建设项目  招投标  信息不对称  逆向选择  道德风险  委托代理
文章编号:1000-7717(2007)03-0049-03
修稿时间:2006年12月23

A Discussion on how to Choose the Mechanism of the Tender for Construction Project Which has no Lower Limit on Bids
GAO Hai-yan,LI Ai-chun,ZHENG Jian-guo.A Discussion on how to Choose the Mechanism of the Tender for Construction Project Which has no Lower Limit on Bids[J].Optimization of Capital Construction,2007,28(3):49-51.
Authors:GAO Hai-yan  LI Ai-chun  ZHENG Jian-guo
Abstract:What the mechanism of the tender for construction project which has no lower limit on bids can form a objective competition environment,which can.urge the firms of construction project to intensify their manergement,decrease their costs and enhance their productivity.based on the theory of their symmetric information in communication economics,it analysed the symmetric information actions of project management in the processing of bidding.It designed a model on bidding system of construction project on the basis of the theory of client-agent and explored a reasonable mechanism of the tender.
Keywords:construction project  bidding system  reverse logistics  moral hazard  client-agent
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