The negative trade-off between risk and incentives: Evidence from the american whaling industry |
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Authors: | Eric Hilt |
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Institution: | aDepartment of Economics, Wellesley College, Wellesley, MA 02481, USA |
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Abstract: | This paper analyzes the trade-off between risk and incentives in the share contracts of the American whaling industry. Using a newly collected panel of 5378 individuals who sailed on more than 1000 whaling voyages from 1855–68, the response of sailors’ compensation to an increase in risk is estimated. The risks used to identify this response resulted from the commerce-raiding naval vessels of the Confederacy during the Civil War. As the Confederate cruisers sailed primarily in the Atlantic, and therefore posed far less of a threat to whaling voyages to other oceans, a quasi-experimental approach focusing on the differences between Atlantic voyages compared to others is implemented. The results are consistent with a negative trade-off between risk and incentives in the industry’s contracts. Moreover, evidence is found of selection among less risk-averse sailors and merchants into riskier voyages during the war. |
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Keywords: | Risk Incentives Whaling Compensation Civil war Moral hazard |
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