混合所有制、股权激励与融资决策中的防御行为--基于动态权衡理论的证据

文章基于动态权衡理论，以1999-2014年上市公司为样本，运用混合所有制改革这一“自然实验”条件，研究了高管股权激励对其融资决策中防御行为的影响，分离出激励和治理双重效应。研究发现：(1)股权激励有助于抑制高管融资决策中的防御行为，但这种效应只存在于民营企业中；(2)对于国有企业，只在股权分置改革后才观察到类似效果，而股改前高管在减少债务融资的同时，提高了股权激励水平，自我激励问题明显；(3)公司股权混合度越高，其在赋予高管股权激励上越谨慎，但在国有股比例较高的公司中，混合所有制改革显著提高了股权激励水平；(4)股权混合安排显著改进了股权激励契约在抑制高管防御行为方面的效率，这种效应在非国有股比例较高的公司中更强。

Mixed Ownership Structure,Equity Incentives and Managerial Entrenchment in Financing Decision-making:Evidence Based on Dynamic Trade-off Theory

Based on dynamic trade-off theory and A-share listed companies from 1 9 9 9 to 2014,this paper uses mixed ownership structure reform as natural experiment condition to study the effect of equity incentives of executives on defensive behavior in their financing decision-making and isolate the dual effects,namely incentive effect and governance effect. It arrives at the conclusions as follows:firstly,equity incentives help to inhibit defensive behavior in executives’financing decision-making,but this effect only exists in private en-terprises;secondly,a similar effect is observed in SOEs only after non-tradable shares re-form,and before non-tradable shares reform,executives unidirectionally reduce debt fi-nancing while they increase the level of equity incentives,showing obvious autoexcitation problem;thirdly,companies with higher-degree mixed equity are more cautious about granting equity incentives to executives,but in companies with higher proportion of state-owned shares,mixed ownership structure reform obviously increases the level of equity in-centives;fourthly,mixed ownership structure significantly improves the efficiency of in-hibiting executives ’defensive behavior by equity incentive contracts,and this effect is stronger in companies with higher proportion of non-state-owned shares.