Epistemic logics and their game theoretic applications: Introduction |
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Authors: | Mamoru Kaneko |
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Institution: | (1) Institute of Policy and Planning Sciences, University of Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8573, JAPAN (e-mail: kaneko@shako.sk.tsukuba.ac.jp), JP |
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Abstract: | Summary. This paper is written as an introduction to epistemic logics and their game theoretic applications. It starts with both semantics
and syntax of classical logic, and goes to the Hilbert-style proof-theory and Kripke-style model theory of epistemic logics.
In these theories, we discuss individual decision making in some simple game examples. In particular, we will discuss the
distinction between beliefs and knowledge, and how false beliefs play roles in game theoretic decision making. Finally, we
discuss extensions of epistemic logics to incorporate common knowledge. In the extension, we discuss also false beliefs on
common knowledge.
Received: July 1, 2000; revised version: April 19, 2001 |
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Keywords: | and Phrases: Classical logic Epistemic logic Common knowledge logic Beliefs Knowledge Dominant strategy Decision criterion Epistemic depth of a formula |
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