Pareto-improving and revenue-neutral congestion pricing schemes in two-mode traffic networks

This paper studies a Pareto-improving and revenue-neutral congestion pricing scheme on a simple two-mode (highway and transit) network: this scheme aims at simultaneously improving system performance, making every individual user better off, and having zero total revenue. Different Pareto-improving situations are explored when a two-mode transportation system serves for travel groups with different value-of-time (VOT) distributions. Since the congestion pricing scheme suggested here charges transit users negative tolls and automobile users positive tolls, it can be considered as a proper way to implement congestion pricing and transit subsidy in one step, while offsetting the inequity for the poor. For a general VOT distribution of commuters, the condition of Pareto-improving is established, and the impact of the VOT distribution on solving the inequity issue is explored. For a uniform VOT distribution, we show that a Pareto-improving and revenue-neutral pricing scheme always exists for any target modal split pattern that reduces the total system travel time.