Existence and optimality of oligopoly equilibria in linear exchange economies |
| |
Authors: | Jean-Marc Bonnisseau Michael Florig |
| |
Institution: | 1.CERMSEM, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, 106 boulevard de l'H?pital, 75647 Paris cedex 13, FRANCE (e-mail : Jean-Marc.Bonnisseau@univ-paris1.fr)
,FR |
| |
Abstract: | Summary. We consider a linear exchange economy and its successive replicas. We study the notion of Cournot-Walras equilibrium in which
the consumers use the quantities of commodities put on the market as strategic variables. We prove that, generically, if the
number of replications is large enough but finite, the competitive behaviour is an oligopoly equilibrium. Then, under a mild
condition, which may be interpreted in terms of market regulation and/or market activity, we show that any sequence of oligopoly
equilibria of successive replica economies converges to the Walrasian outcome and furthermore that every oligopoly equilibrium
of large, but finite, replica is Pareto optimal. Consequently, under the same assumptions on the fundamentals of the economy,
one has an asymptotic result on the convergence of oligopoly equilibria to the Walras equilibrium together with a generic
existence result for the Cournot-Walras.
Received: June 20, 2002; revised version: November 20, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" Part of this paper was written while the second author was visiting the Universidad de Vigo. The support of the department
of mathematics is gratefully acknowledged.
Correspondence to: J.M. Bonnisseau |
| |
Keywords: | and Phrases: Imperfect competition Oligopoly equilibrium Pareto optimum Linear utility functions Replication |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|