Resource harvesting regulation and enforcement: An evolutionary approach |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Mathematics and Statistics, Northeast Normal University, 5268 Renmin Street, Changchun, Jilin 130024, PR China;2. School of Basic Science, Changchun University of Technology, 2055 Yanan Street, Changchun, Jilin 130012, PR China;1. State Key Laboratory of Mining Disaster Prevention and Control Co-founded by Shandong Province and the Ministry of Science and Technology, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, PR China;2. College of Mathematics and System Sciences, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266510, PR China;3. Graduate School of Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266510, PR China |
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| Abstract: | We study the evolution of compliance and regulation of a renewable common pool resource, a fishery in particular, with appropriators whose decision on whether to comply or not with harvesting quotas is the result of imitation described by a proportional rule. The regulator first sets the optimal quota and then harvesters can choose between compliance and violation. We investigate myopic regulation and optimal regulation regimes with a proportional fine and an endogenized probability of audit. The outcome of regulation is characterized in terms of monomorphic and polymorphic steady states with respect to compliance. Using numerical simulations stability properties are examined, and sensitivity analysis explores the effect of various parameters on polymorphic steady-state outcomes. |
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