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| 从博弈论看保险市场信息不对称的本质及规范举措 | |
| 引用本文： | 徐冉. 从博弈论看保险市场信息不对称的本质及规范举措[J]. 金融理论与实践, 2006, 0(9): 66-69 |
| 作者姓名： | 徐冉 |
| 作者单位： | 武汉大学 经济与管理学院,湖北 武汉 430072;河南财政税务高等专科学校,河南 郑州 450002 |
| 摘 要： | 博弈论是研究信息不对称问题的一种有效方法。保险业作为信息不对称最为集中的行业，保险人与被保险人之间存在着严重的信息不对称，特别是被保险人的逆向选择、道德风险和保险人的违规操作等现象普遍存在，长期困扰着保险界。 |
| 关 键 词： | 保险市场 信息不对称 博弈模型 逆向选择 道德风险 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-4625（2006）09-0066-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-06-01 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-06-01 |
Viewing the Nature of Insurance Market Information Asymmetry from Gaming Theory and Normal Actions to Take |
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| Xu ran. Viewing the Nature of Insurance Market Information Asymmetry from Gaming Theory and Normal Actions to Take[J]. Financial Theory and Practice, 2006, 0(9): 66-69 | |
| Authors: | Xu ran |
| Abstract: | Gaming theory is an effective method for researching information asymmetry. As for insurance industry, which is generally regarded as a most centralized industry of information asymmetry, there is serious information asymmetry between the insurer and the insured, especially, such phenomena as adverse choice and moral hazard of the insured, and violation of operation by the insurer are quite common, troubling insurance community for a long time. |
| Keywords: | insurance market information asymmetry gaming model adverse choice a moral hazard |
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