Multi-issue Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, One University dr., Orange, CA 92866, United States;2. WWZ, University of Basel, Peter Merian-Weg 6, CH-4002 Basel, Switzerland;3. Research Center SAFE, Goethe University Frankfurt, Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3, 60629 Frankfurt, Germany;1. Institute for Comprehensive Analysis of the Economy and Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Altenbergerstrasse 69, Linz, Austria;2. Department of Mathematics, Yale University, 10 Hillhouse Avenue, New Haven, CT 06511, United States;1. IQUADRAT Informatica S.L., Barcelona, Spain;2. Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, University of Bristol, BS8 1UB, Bristol, United Kingdom;3. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Ioannina, GR-45110, Ioannina, Greece;1. Washington University in St. Louis, United States;2. MIT, United States |
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| Abstract: | ![]()
The first part of this paper shows that in a noncooperative bargaining model with alternating offers and time preferences the timing of issues (the agenda) matters even if players become arbitrarily patient. This result raises the question of which agenda should come up endogenously when agents bargain over a set of unrelated issues. It is found that simultaneous bargaining over “packages” should be a prevailing phenomenon, but we also point to the possibility of multiple equilibria involving even considerable delay. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C78. |
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