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组织冗余、股权制衡和独立董事制度依赖
引用本文:张斌.组织冗余、股权制衡和独立董事制度依赖[J].山西财经大学学报,2007,29(6):81-87.
作者姓名:张斌
作者单位:扬州大学,管理学院,江苏,扬州,225009
摘    要:在组织行为和公司治理的视角下,以我国上市公司为研究对象,考察了组织冗余和独立董事制度的关系。结果表明,组织冗余增强了上市公司对独立董事比例的依赖,同时也削弱了公司对具有资源支持背景的独立董事的依赖。这一结果为代理理论的治理均衡逻辑提供了支持,有助于理解新兴资本市场中冗余对组织结构的影响以及上市公司聘请独立董事的动机。

关 键 词:组织冗余  独立董事  股权制衡
文章编号:1007-9556(2007)06-0081-07
收稿时间:2007-04-17
修稿时间:2007-04-17

Organizational Slack and Firms' Dependence on Independent Directors
ZHANG Bin.Organizational Slack and Firms'''' Dependence on Independent Directors[J].Journal of Shanxi Finance and Economics University,2007,29(6):81-87.
Authors:ZHANG Bin
Institution:School of Management, Yangzhou University, Yangzhou 225009, China
Abstract:This paper investigates organization slack's impact on firm's dependence on independent directors in visions of organization and corporate governance.The author finds that the relation between organizational slack and proportion of independent directors to all directors is significantly stronger in companies with poor shareholders' balance and checks than those of normal ones;moreover,the relation is only significantly positive in the former type of companies.The author also finds that slack may impair firms' will to import those independent directors with background of industrial expert and political connection whose experience can be of benefit to organizational resources.These results may help us better understand slack's influence on organization and incentives for importing of independent directors.
Keywords:organizational slack  independent directors  dependence on resource-supported background
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