| 旅行社与导游委托代理模型解析 |
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| 引用本文： | 田喜洲,田敏.旅行社与导游委托代理模型解析[J].旅游学刊,2009,24(6). |
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| 作者姓名： | 田喜洲 田敏 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 重庆工商大学旅游学院,重庆,400067;长江上游经济研究中心产业经济研究院,重庆,400067
2. 长江上游经济研究中心产业经济研究院,重庆,400067 |
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| 摘 要： | 旅行社和导游之间是典型的委托一代理关系,导游的工作特征使得旅行社对其监督的成本很高,也就是说旅行社很难观测到导游的努力水平.本文根据委托一代理理论.构建经济模型说明,在这种情况下,旅行社与导游不会改变他们之间现有的报酬模式,因为这是一种满足了参与约束与激励相客约束的均衡结果.而旅游行政管理者要做的就是完善现有的导游报酬机制.特别是要通过制度设计与行政手段来解决导游监督、回扣等问题.
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| 关 键 词： | 委托一代理 旅行社 导游 |
An Explanation of Principal-Agent Model between Traval Agency and Tour Guide |
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| TIAN Xi-zhou,TIAN Min.An Explanation of Principal-Agent Model between Traval Agency and Tour Guide[J].Tourism Tribune,2009,24(6). |
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| Authors: | TIAN Xi-zhou TIAN Min |
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| Institution: | 1.Tourism School of Chongqing Technologcial & Business University;Chongqing 400067;China;2.Industrial Economic School of Yangtze Up-River Economy Research Center;China |
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| Abstract: | The relationship between travel agency and tour guide is typically that of principal-agent. A tour guide's work leads to high cost for the travel agency to supervise,i,e.,it is hard for the travel agency to observe his endeavour. The paper,in accordance with the theory of "principal-agent" ,constructs an economic model. Under such circumstances,both travel agency and tour guide will not change the available reward model,because this is the result of balance that meets the constraint and stimulation. What to... |
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| Keywords: | principal-agent travel agency tour guide |
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