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所有者和经营者的风险偏好与最佳报酬安排
引用本文:吴艳辉,张明华.所有者和经营者的风险偏好与最佳报酬安排[J].经济问题,2002(6):14-16,39.
作者姓名:吴艳辉  张明华
作者单位:1. 中国人民大学 商学院,北京,100045
2. 山西省发展计划委员会,山西,太原,030002
摘    要:从委托代理矛盾入手,对所有者与经营者的行为进行分析,按照效用最大化原则建立了委托代理矛盾的数学模型,并对模型求解,得出风险偏好与报酬安排的最佳关系。所有者与经营者的关系是委托代理关系,风险偏好是契约安排的最重要的一个参数;只要所有者与经营者的剩余索取权之比等于他们各自的风险偏好之比,就可以得到最佳的激励报酬安排。

关 键 词:所有者  经营者  委托代理关系  风险偏好  剩余索取权  最佳报酬安排  中国
文章编号:1004-972X(2002)06-0014-03

The best arrangement and the risk-loving of the owner or manager
WU Yan-hui,ZHANG Ming-hua.The best arrangement and the risk-loving of the owner or manager[J].On Economic Problems,2002(6):14-16,39.
Authors:WU Yan-hui  ZHANG Ming-hua
Abstract:According to principal-agent theory, this article lucubrates the action of the owner and manager, and constructs a model. Through the model, we educe the best arrangement between the risk-loving and residual claims. This article considers that the relation between the owner and manager is a principal-agent relation, the risk-loving is a very important parameter in the contract arrangement, and we can gain the best arrangement as long as the ratio of the residual claims is equal to that of the risk-loving between the owner and manager.
Keywords:principal-agent  risk loving  residual claims  the best arrangement
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