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基于供应商入侵的两级供应链批量博弈及决策
引用本文:谢军,谢菲,易东波,徐逸钊.基于供应商入侵的两级供应链批量博弈及决策[J].科技和产业,2022,22(6):264-270.
作者姓名:谢军  谢菲  易东波  徐逸钊
作者单位:南昌工程学院 工商管理学院,南昌 330099
摘    要:考虑由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的两级供应链,构建了三阶段博弈模型,研究在不对称信息下供应商入侵对零售商订单量及供应商库存量决策的影响。通过设计市场规模阈值及调查市场规模,进而得出每一阶段下供应商和零售商的利润。对3个阶段供应商和零售商利润先后进行比较分析,发现当后一阶段利润大于前一阶段时,供应链成员才会对订单量及库存量进行调整,从而得出在每阶段零售商订单数量及供应商库存数量范围。结果表明,供应商入侵在一定的零售商订单量及供应商库存量范围内可以提高供应链利润。

关 键 词:供应商入侵  两级供应链  批量博弈  不对称信息

Batch Game and Decision of Two-tier Supply Chain Based on Supplier Encroachment
Abstract:Considering a two-tier supply chain composed of one supplier and one retailer, a three-stage game model is constructed to study the impact of supplier encroachment on Retailer''s order quantity and supplier''s inventory decision under asymmetric information. Through designing the market size threshold and investigating the market size, the profit of suppliers and retailers in each stage is obtained. After comparing the profits of suppliers and retailers in three stages, it is found that when the profits of the latter stage are larger than that of the former stage, the members of the supply chain will adjust the order quantity and inventory quantity, so as to get the scope of order quantity and supplier inventory quantity of retailers in each stage. The results show that supplier encroachment can improve the profit of supply chain within a certain range of retailer orders and supplier inventory.
Keywords:supplier encroachment  two-tier supply chain  batch game  information asymmetric
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