基于委托代理理论的第三方物流中的激励机制分析

根据委托代理理论，增加信息激励这一变量，建立第三方物流中物流外包方与物流提供商之间的委托代理关系模型,分析了第三方物流中由于信息不对称而产生的道德风险问题及其激励机制设计问题。并通过对物流外包方代理成本和物流提供商激励报酬强度系数影响因素的进一步分析，指出构建物流服务提供商激励机制必须反映物流服务提供商的特质、外部环境条件的变化以及外包方代理成本等因素的影响。

Analysis of Incentive Mechanism in the Third Party Logistics Based on the Principal-agent Theory

According to principal-agent theory, this paper adds one new variable and sets up a principal-agent model in the third party logistics between the outsourcer and the logistics service provider and analyzes moral hazard and incentive mechanism designing, which is caused by asymmetric information in the third party logistics. Then, through further analysis of the agent costs of outsourcer and incentive remuneration intensity coefficient of logistics providers, the paper points out that it must reflect the influences of the logistics providers' specialty, the change of external environment and the costs of the outsourcer to design incentive mechanism.