股权再融资、盈余管理与大股东的寻租行为

我国上市公司处于大股东的超强控制状态,大股东与中小股东之间存在严重的信息不对称,导致大股东在股权再融资过程中表现出强烈的盈余管理动机.本文研究了我国资本市场参与者的行为与盈余管理之间的关系,并分析了对资本配置效率的影响效应.大股东通过操纵报告盈余来改变会计盈余的时间分布和误导投资者,从而攫取更多的隐性收益,造成资本市场配置效率的降低.研究结果表明:(1)大股东通过盈余管理在股权再融资过程中可以获得中小股东无法得到的隐性收益;(2)大股东的收益随着盈余管理程度的增加而提升,中小股东的财富随着盈余管理程度的增加而降低;(3)盈余管理程度的增加将降低上市公司的资本配置效率和企业价值.因此,大股东通过盈余管理实现了对小股东财富的掠夺效应,造成了上市公司资本配置效率、公司价值、声誉和后续融资能力的下降.

Study on Equity Refinancing, Earnings Management and Rent Seeking of Large Shareholders

The listed companies in China are strongly controlled by dominant shareholders.The information asymmetry between the large and small shareholders leads to the strong motivation of earnings manipulation for dominant shareholders in seasoned equity offerings.This paper mainly analyzes the relationship between market participants and earnings manipulation,and examines earnings manipulation and its effect on capital allocation efficiency.Dominant shareholders can alter the assessment of the listed companies' profitability and investment value through manipulating the time distribution of earnings,and raise equity price and seize more benefits.The results suggest that large shareholders can obtain benefits at the cost of small shareholders through earnings manipulation in the course of equity refinancing,and that the benefits of large shareholders increase with the rising of earnings manipulation,while the benefits of small shareholders decrease with the rising of earnings manipulation.The results also show that the capital allocation efficiency and corporate value will decrease with the rising of earnings manipulation.Larger shareholders expropriate outsider investors through earnings management in SEOs.Thus capital allocation efficiency,firm value,reputation and refinancing ability for listed companies are heavily damaged.