Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences |
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Authors: | Larry Samuelson Jeroen M Swinkels |
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Institution: | a Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706-1320, USA;b Olin School of Business, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO 63130, USA |
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Abstract: | We explore the interaction between evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences. To do so, we define a limit Nash equilibrium for a lexicographic game as the limit of Nash equilibria of nearby games with continuous preferences. Nash equilibria of lexicographic games are limit Nash equilibria, but not conversely. Modified evolutionarily stable strategies (Binmore and Samuelson, 1992. J. Econ. Theory 57, 278–305) are limit Nash equilibria. Modified evolutionary stability differs from “lexicographic evolutionarily stability” (defined by extending the common characterization of evolutionary stability to lexicographic preferences) in the order in which limits in the payoff space and the space of invasion barriers are taken. |
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Keywords: | Lexicographic preferences Evolutionary stability Complexity Lexicographic Nash equilibrium |
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