Two-sided altruism, Lindahl equilibrium, and Pareto optimality in overlapping generations models

Summary. This paper extends the Samuelsonian overlapping generations general equilibrium framework to encompass a variety of altruistic preferences by recasting it into a Lindahl equilibrium framework. The First and the Second Welfare theorems hold for Lindahl equilibrium with respect to the Malinvaud optimality criterion but not with respect to the Pareto optimality criterion. A complete characterization of Pareto optimal allocations is provided using the Lindahl equilibrium prices.Received: 2 October 2003, Revised: 13 September 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, D62, D64, C62.An earlier draft of the paper was prepared for presentation at the Sixth World Congress of the Econometric Society, 1990, Barcelona, Spain. Much of this work was done when I was at Yale University and University of California-San Diego. I am grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal and to Don Brown, Vince Crawford and Joel Sobel for many insightful comments and encouragements on an earlier draft of the paper.