| 基于演化博弈的钢铁企业环境污染问题研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 姚江芬,张晓玲.基于演化博弈的钢铁企业环境污染问题研究[J].价值工程,2012,31(2):319-320. |
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| 作者姓名： | 姚江芬 张晓玲 |
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| 作者单位： | 燕山大学经济管理学院,秦皇岛,066004 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文应用演化博弈理论,从钢铁企业和环保部门都只存在有限理性的角度出发,研究两者之间相互作用的策略选择行为,结果表明:长期而言,两个博弈方的策略选择取决于他们所处的初始状态的影响。
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| 关 键 词： | 环境污染 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 复制动态方程 |
Research on Problems of Environmental Pollution of Iron and Steel Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game Theory |
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| Yao Jiangfen
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Zhang Xiaoling.Research on Problems of Environmental Pollution of Iron and Steel Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game Theory[J].Value Engineering,2012,31(2):319-320. |
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| Authors: | Yao Jiangfen Zhang Xiaoling |
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| Institution: | Yao Jiangfen;Zhang Xiaoling(School of Economics and Management,Yanshan University,Qinhuangdao 066004,China) |
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| Abstract: | The paper studies strategic choice behavior of the interaction between iron and steel enterprises and environmental protection department from the perspective of existing in bounded rationality of both,by using Evolutionary Game Theory.The results show that two game parties’ strategic choices are determined by the influence of their initial state. |
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| Keywords: | environmental pollution evolutionary game evolutionarily stable strategy replicated dynamic equation |
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