| 不完全信息下的审计策略 |
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| 引用本文： | 尤家佳.不完全信息下的审计策略[J].财贸研究,2005,16(6):85-90. |
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| 作者姓名： | 尤家佳 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海财经大学,会计学院,上海,200433 |
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| 基金项目： | 本文写作过程中得到了上海财经大学蒋传海教授主持的讨论班的建议和帮助.作者感谢蒋传海教授以及上海财经大学硕士生常芳国、何晓强、蒋琪、李丹蒙、李勇、刘莉、杨渭文同学提供的宝贵意见.当然,文责自负. |
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| 摘 要： | 审计是为了解决被审计单位与外部之间的信息不对称问题。本文建立了不完全信息下会计师事务所与被审计单位之间的博弈模型,分析了会计师事务所的策略和被审计单位的策略,指出了决定博弈均衡的制度要素,包括审计收费、转换会计师事务所成本等的影响,并进一步探讨如何通过制度建设来提高审计质量。
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| 关 键 词： | 审计策略 信息不对称 博弈 转换成本 制度建设 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-05-22 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-05-22 |
Audit Strategy under Incomplete Information |
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| YOU Jia-jia.Audit Strategy under Incomplete Information[J].Finance and Trade Research,2005,16(6):85-90. |
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| Authors: | YOU Jia-jia |
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| Institution: | Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433 |
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| Abstract: | Auditing helps to solve the information asymmetry problem between the company and the external world. The writer of this paper intends to set up a game model between certified public accountant and the client under incomplete information. By making use of this model, the writer conducts analyses into the strategies adopted by the two sides and points out the system factors that influence the game equilibrium, which include collecting fees for auditing, transferring auditing cost, etc. Lastly, the writer suggests the ways of how to improve the auditing quality by improving relevant institutional construction. |
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| Keywords: | audit strategy information asymmetry game institutional construction switch cost |
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