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Unobserved correlation in private-value ascending auctions
Authors:Daniel Quint  
Affiliation:aDepartment of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 7428 Social Science Bldg., 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison WI 53706, United States
Abstract:In private-value ascending auctions, the winner's willingness to pay is not observed, leading to underidentification of many econometric models. I calculate tight bounds on expected revenue and optimal reserve price for the case of symmetric and affiliated private values.
Keywords:Partial identification   Bounds estimation   Affiliated private values
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