The Uneasy Case for the Flat Tax

Social contract theories assume thatbecause personal security and private property are at risk ina state of nature, citizens will agree to grant Leviathan a monopolyof violence. But what is to prevent Leviathan from turning onhis citizens once they have lain down their arms? The socialcontract leaves citizens worse off unless Leviathan can fetterhimself, as constitutional democracies seek to do. Self-bindingfetters are hard to find. We suggest that schemes of progressivetaxation, in which marginal tax rates increase with taxable income,may be useful incentives to realign Leviathan's incentives withthose of his citizens. Income taxes give Leviathan an equityclaim in his state's economy, and progressive taxes give hima greater residual interest in upside payoffs. Leviathan willthen demand higher side payments from interest groups beforehe imposes value-destroying regulations.