解决我国银行监管效能问题的制度设计——运用管制俘获理论进行分析

管制俘获理论认为，在存在政府干预的情况下会产生管制俘获问题。本文的分析表明，银行监管领域也存在着“俘获”现象，它将进一步导致银行监管的效能扭曲。为此，需要从加强监管者的建设和监督、改进监管者的约束激励机制、监管者与被监管者双重透明化、落实监管的问责制与建立被监管者严格问责制等几个方面进行银行监管的制度设计。

The Design of System for Solving the Problem about Inefficiency of China's Banking Supervision

The theory of regulatory capture holds that government interference is likely to result in capture issues. The paper points out that there exists regulatory capture in the field of banking regulatory and it can further bring about the loss of effi- ciency of supervision. Solutions are as follows. First, enforce the supervision to regulator; second, improve the restriction and incentive system to regulator; third, strengthen the transparency to both regulator and the regulated agencies; finally, carry out the system of duty to the regulator and set up the duty system to the regulated agencies.