首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      


Political costs and corporate tax avoidance: Evidence from sin firms
Institution:1. Shenzhen Finance Institute, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, China;2. University of Oregon, United States;3. School of Accounting and Finance, Faculty of Business, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong SAR, China;4. Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR, China;1. Mendoza College of Business, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556, United States;2. Ohio University College of Business, Ohio University, Athens, OH 45701, United States;1. Hershel Anderson Endowed Professor, Department of Accounting, G. Brint Ryan College of Business, University of North Texas, Denton, TX 76201, United States;2. Department of Accountancy and Business Law, Cameron School of Business, University of North Carolina Wilmington, Wilmington, NC 28403, United States;1. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Canada;2. Nankai Business School, Nankai University, China;3. School of Accounting, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, China;1. Henry B. Tippie Research Chair in Accounting at the University of Iowa, 21 E. Market St., Iowa City, IA, USA;2. Assistant Professor in Accounting at the Colorado State University, 501 W. Laurel St., Fort Collins, CO, USA;1. University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, United States;2. Louisiana State University, United States;1. School of Management and Economics, CUHK Business School, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, China;2. Department of Accountancy and Law, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, China;3. Department of Accounting, National Chung Hsing University, Taiwan
Abstract:The products and services of firms operating in sin industries (alcohol, tobacco, gambling, and firearms) run contrary to social norms and can produce significant negative externalities for society. As such, we expect that sin firms are at greater risk of incurring political costs in the form of additional regulation, higher excise taxes, or capital market intervention if they come under scrutiny for their income tax avoidance practices. Because of the nature of their products, regulators and policymakers are likely to face less pushback on new regulations or taxes on these firms. Sin firms start with a lower ability to influence the political process than firms in non-sin industries. Consequently, we hypothesize and find that sin firms exhibit less tax avoidance than non-sin firms, particularly through uncertain and more risky tax avoidance strategies. The negative relationship between the status of sin firms and tax avoidance is less pronounced in firms that accumulate political capital via intensive lobbying activities. Exploiting changes in partisan control of the Congress and White House, difference-in-differences tests show that firearm firms engage in less (more) tax avoidance when the Democrats (Republican) control both the Congress and White House. Overall, we conclude that political costs play an important role in corporate tax avoidance decisions.
Keywords:Tax avoidance  Political costs  Sin firms
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号