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政府激励下的建筑废弃物资源化博弈研究
引用本文:代春泉,刘浩,李海生,张超.政府激励下的建筑废弃物资源化博弈研究[J].科技和产业,2023,23(7):23-28.
作者姓名:代春泉  刘浩  李海生  张超
作者单位:山东科技大学 土木工程与建筑学院,山东 青岛 266590;荣华建设集团有限公司, 山东 青岛 266000;山东科技大学 基建处, 山东 青岛 266590
基金项目:教育部社科基金(20YJAZH022);
摘    要:针对中国建筑废弃物持续增多、建筑原料匮乏等问题,运用动态博弈理论,构建建筑企业与建材企业的双寡头博弈市场,建立适应度函数并进行求解,分析政府奖惩制度对博弈双方策略选择的影响,并利用MATLAB软件进行仿真模拟。结果显示:政府因素在促进资源化发展的过程中具有重要作用;不同的奖惩力度对博弈双方策略的选择、演化速度影响不同;合适的政府奖惩力度对资源化发展具有推进作用,单一一方实现资源化会对另一方产生阻碍作用。因此政府需要从补贴和惩处两个方面同时加强管控,才能促使建筑企业和建材企业均选择资源化的策略,从而实现资源化发展。

关 键 词:双寡头博弈  建筑废弃物资源化  政府奖惩力度

Research on the Game of Building Waste Recycling of Government Incentives
Abstract:In view of the continuous increase of construction waste and the shortage of building materials in China, the dynamic game theory is used to build a duopoly game market between construction enterprises and building materials enterprises. An fitness function established to solve it. The impact of the government reward and punishment system on the strategy choice of both sides of the game is analyzed, and MATLAB software is used for simulation. The results show that the government factor plays an important role in promoting the development of resources.Different rewards and punishments have different effects on the choice and evolution speed of the strategies of both sides of the game.Appropriate government rewards and punishments can promote the development of resource, and a single party''s realization of resource will hinder the other party. Therefore, the government needs to strengthen management and control from both subsidy and punishment aspects at the same time, promote construction enterprises and building materials enterprises to choose resource-based strategies, so as to achieve resource-based development.
Keywords:duopoly game  reuse of construction waste  government incentives and punishments
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