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Preference aggregation under uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto
Authors:Christopher P Chambers  Takashi Hayashi  
Institution:aDivision of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Mail Code 228-77, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA;bDepartment of Economics, University of Texas at Austin, BRB 1.116, Austin, TX 78712, USA
Abstract:Following Mongin J. Econ. Theory 66 (1995) 313; J. Math. Econ. 29 (1998) 331], we study social aggregation of subjective expected utility preferences in a Savage framework. We argue that each of Savage's P3 and P4 are incompatible with the strong Pareto property. A representation theorem for social preferences satisfying Pareto indifference and conforming to the state-dependent expected utility model is provided.
Keywords:Harsanyi's theorem  Bayesian experts  Subjective expected utility  State-dependent expected utility
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