Risk aversion in auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders: A “desensitizer” from uncertainty |
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| Authors: | F lix Mu oz-Garcí a,Sandra Orozco-Alem n |
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| Affiliation: | a School of Economic Sciences, 103G Hulbert Hall, Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164-6210, United States;b Department of Economics, 4518 Wesley W. Posvar Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, United States |
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| Abstract: | In the context of first-price auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders, we show that risk aversion not only increases a player’s bid, but also makes him less sensitive to the probability that other bidders are informed about his private valuation. |
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| Keywords: | First-price auctions Asymmetrically informed bidders Risk aversion Unknown valuations |
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