Capital structure,investment unanimity,and public goods: the case for social responsibility |
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Institution: | Canisius College, 2001 Main Street, Buffalo, NY 14208, USA |
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Abstract: | This paper examines the concepts of optimal capital structure and investment in an economy where government’s role is the provision of a public good. That public good is financed through current tax revenues and the sale of government securities. Absent such complications, traditional finance theory has established the equivalence among (competitive) value maximization, unanimity, and Pareto optimality. In the setting of this paper, however, the market value of government securities is not determined by the value of public good production, and the correspondence between value maximization, Parto optimality, and unanimity will not generally hold without significant restrictions on the tax structure. Otherwise, value maximization is neither an optimal nor unanimously supported objective for the firm. |
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