| 股权制衡的公司治理绩效模型研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 吕怀立,李婉丽.股权制衡的公司治理绩效模型研究[J].经济与管理研究,2011(5). |
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| 作者姓名： | 吕怀立 李婉丽 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 西安交通大学管理学院,西安市,710049
2. 上海对外贸易学院会计学院,上海市,201620 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目“行为人非理性代理冲突对我国上市公司投资的影响研究”(09YJA630128)的阶段性研究成果; 国家自然科学基金项目“中国资本市场控股股东利益转移问题研究”(70572040)的后续研究成果 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文分别从控股股东与非控股大股东的绩效函数出发,建立股权制衡的公司治理绩效模型,用以分析控股股东利益侵占和公司股权制衡的作用关系。研究发现:一方面,公司股权制衡受到控股股东侵占行为的操纵,表现为控股股东侵占对股权制衡的正向作用;另一方面,股权制衡能够提升公司治理绩效,表现为股权制衡对控股股东侵占的负向影响。另外,非控股大股东具有与控股股东相互合谋的动机,以实现对公司中小股东利益的联合侵占。
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| 关 键 词： | 股权制衡 股东合谋 公司治理绩效 |
A Model Study on the Corporate Governance Performance of Shareholders Balance Mechanism |
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| LV Huai-li,LI Wan-li.A Model Study on the Corporate Governance Performance of Shareholders Balance Mechanism[J].Research on Economics and Management,2011(5). |
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| Authors: | LV Huai-li LI Wan-li |
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| Institution: | LV Huai-li~1,LI Wan-li~(1,2) (1.School of Management,Xi'an Jiaotong University,Xi'an 710049,2.Accounting School,Shanghai Institute of Foreign Trade,Shanghai 201620) |
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| Abstract: | We construct a model about the corporate governance performance of shareholders balance mechanism (short as SBM) to analyze the relationship between SBM and controlling shareholder' s tunneling behaviors.From the performance functions of controlling and non - control large shareholders,our mathematical research finds out corporate SBM is manipulated by the tunneling of controlling shareholder on one hand,which shows that the controlling shareholder's tunneling has positive effect on corporate SBM;and on the... |
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| Keywords: | Shareholders Balance Mechanism(SBM ) Shareholders Collusion Corporate Governance Performance |
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