Expected revenue of all-pay and first-price sealed-bid auctions with affiliated signals |
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Authors: | Erwin Amann Wolfgang Leininger |
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Institution: | (1) Present address: Department of Economics, Dortmund University, Vogelpothsweg 87, D-44221 Dortmund, Germany |
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Abstract: | In the general symmetric auction framework of Milgrom and Weber (1982) it is shown—as a new manifestation of thelinkage principle—that the all-pay sealed-bid auction yieldshigher expected revenue than the standard first-price sealed-bid auction. This raises the question why sealed-bid auctions of the standard first-price variety are observed in practice whereas the all-pay variety is not. |
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